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Abstract 
Yampolskiy and others have shown that the space of possible minds is vast, actually 
infinite (Yampolskiy, 2015). A question of interest is “Which activities can minds 
perform during their lifetime?” This question is very broad, thus in this article 
restricted to “Which non-boring activities can minds perform?” The space of potential 
non-boring activities has been called by Yudkowsky “fun space” (Yudkowsky, 2009). 
This paper aims to discuss the relation between various types of minds and the part of 
the fun space, which is accessible for them.  
 
1 Introduction 
We motivate the relevance of the question “Which non-boring activities can minds 
perform?” as follows: There is optimism for a significant extension of the lifetime of 
humans in the near and medium future. Yet, some people expressed concern that there 
is not enough accessible fun space, thus much longer lives would not be fulfilling and 
mostly boring (Dvorsky, 2012).   
In addition, future scenarios can be envisaged when humans are enhanced by 
intelligence amplification and other transhuman features, potentially supported by 
friendly AI. Further scenarios include creating substrate-autonomous persons, e.g. 
through uploading or whole brain emulation (Bostrom, 2014). In the latter case 
lifetime could increase almost indefinitely, and also former unknown sensations could 
be perceived. Also for this option, concerns have been raised that it will turn out to be 
boring for such enhanced humans due to the lack of remaining intellectual challenges. 
In contrast, others believe the fun space is large enough for either scenario (e.g. 
Moravec, 1988; Yudkowsky, 2009; Bostrom, 2008) 
Yet another view by Pearce is that in a parallel development boredom will be 
“neurochemically impossible” through advanced technology (Pearce, 2012; 
Yampolskiy, 2015). Therefore, although human minds are only a small subset of the 
space of possible minds, for this type of minds the question about sufficient non-
boring activities, i.e. enough accessible fun space, is very important. 
In addition, we are addressing the question of accessible fun space also for non-
human minds by aiming to contribute to one aspect of the field of “intellectology” 
(Yampolskiy, 2015). Yampolskiy has introduced “intellectology” as a new area of 
study in order to turn away from a human-centric view regarding minds and to 
examine in more detail features of any possible minds. This universe of possible mind 
designs is actually vast and certainly merits investigation; especially given the 
possible scenario that one group of minds, that is minds of AI agents, may cohabit 
with us in the not so far future. 
This paper is structured as follows: In the following section we provide an 
introduction to the space of minds. This is followed by an introduction to the space of 
 2 
fun. In the central section we analyze relationships between the space of minds and 
the space of fun. 
 
2 The space of minds 
When we reason about minds we tend to think of human minds only. This is because 
of the anthropomorphic bias. However, in addition, there are other minds, which we 
encounter on earth, the minds of higher order animals, and then there are various 
minds, which we can imagine as possibility and perhaps even more beyond our 
imagination (“unknown unknowns”). It has been shown that the space of possible 
minds is vast (e.g. Sloman, 1984; Goertzel, 2006; Yudkowsky, 2008; Yampolskiy, 
2015).  
Examples for potential minds could be human-designed AI minds, self-improving 
minds, a combination of minds constituting itself a mind and many more.  There have 
been several attempts to classify the space of minds (Yampolskiy, 2015). In fact, the 
space of human minds forms only a tiny subset within the universe of possible minds 
(Yudkowsky, 2008).  The space of possible minds can be considered as the set of 
possible cognitive algorithms. Based on this and on the limited number of cognitive 
algorithms, which human minds can potentially perform, it can be concluded that the 
majority of possible minds is more intelligent than human minds. Yampolskiy and 
Fox describe this insight as another example of a Copernican Revolution, i.e. a 
revision of the view that humanity is central, which in this case refers to minds 
(Yampolskiy & Fox, 2012). 
Yampolskiy shows that the set of mind designs is infinite and countable and that 
all minds can be generated sequentially by a deterministic algorithm, based on a 
variant of the Levin Search (Yampolskiy, 2015). By linking a mind to a number, 
Yampolskiy also demonstrates that “[…] a mind could never be completely 
destroyed, making minds theoretically immortal. A particular mind may not be 
embodied at a given time, but the idea of it is always present.” (Yampolskiy, 2015). 
The fact that minds are countable will be useful when establishing relations with the 
fun space.  
 
3 The space of fun 
Regarding the goals and the motivation of minds Bostrom distinguishes between two 
theses, the orthogonality thesis and the instrumental convergence thesis (Bostrom, 
2014). The former states that “more or less any level of intelligence could in principle 
be combined with more or less any final goal.”, while the latter proposes that there is 
a rather limited number of instrumental values which many intelligent agents share.  
The focus of this paper are those goals of minds that are related to the discovery 
of novelties and to having fun, which is the opposite of boredom. Yudkowsky 
proposes a link between novelty and fun: “Novelty appears to be one of the major 
keys to fun, and for there to exist an infinite amount of fun there must be an infinite 
amount of novelty.” (Yudkowsky, 2009). We shall specify this further below.  
Omohundro defines four drives for AI minds: Efficiency, self-preservation, 
acquisition, and creativity (Omohundro, 2007, Omohundro, 2008). Three of these 
drives address novelty: The creativity drive is about novelty by definition (leads to the 
development of new concepts, algorithms, theorems, devices, and processes), but so 
are the efficiency drive (aiming for novel algorithms and methodologies) and the 
acquisition drive (aiming for novel resources). Only the self-preservation drive is 
linked more indirectly to novelty, which has to be relative to a particular self. Hence, 
without self-preservation everything might be seen as novel to some new version of 
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that self. However, Omohundro does not mention “fun” to be linked to any of these 
AI drives.  
We know that at least human minds aim for accessing fun space. Therefore, the 
subset of all minds, with the distinction to have the objective of having fun, is at least 
the set of all human minds, but potentially it is bigger. Yet, when pondering over such 
questions it is always critical to beware of the anthropomorphic bias:  
 
 It could well be possible that fun is specific to humans only and other minds 
do not aim for fun. The actions of these minds are still likely to be steered by the 
above drives, yet they may not aim for fun as an epiphenomenon and may be 
satisfied by pursuing boring activities as long as these serve their goals (Yet, we 
seem to observe at least some higher order animals having fun.)  
 
 If there are other minds that aim for fun, this “fun” may look extremely 
different from what is fun for humans and may well be unimaginable for humans. 
Both, the sensation that other minds “feel” as fun as well as the activities that 
trigger this sensation could be very different, e.g. activities that are considered 
tedious by humans may cause for other minds fun-type sensations as 
epiphenomenon.   
 
 There may be certain minds, who do aim for fun, but apply “wireheading” 
methods, which is obtaining the reward through direct stimulation without 
otherwise required productive behavior. Hence, drugs and/or technologies provide 
them effortlessly and permanently with what they consider as fun (Yampolskiy, 
2014).  
 
What is the relation between novelty and fun?  
It seems that fun is useful to motivate exploration, innovation and discovery. Stanley 
and Lehman show that novelty search is more successful than objective-based search 
(Lehman & Stanley, 2015). Therefore, striving for fun of human minds could be 
explained by evolution. Novelties are critical for human development, and fun is, at 
least sometimes, an epiphenomenon while pursuing novelties or at the moment when 
discovering novelties. However, it can be easily shown that, at least for human minds, 
discovering novelties and having fun is not the same, since there are numerous 
novelties that are boring for humans; or a specific novelty could be fun for one human 
mind, but boring for others. 
Schmidhuber proposes the following options to access fun space, which we will 
take into account below: “There are at least two ways of having fun: execute a 
learning algorithm that improves the compression of the already known data […], or 
execute actions that generate more data, then learn to compress/understand the new 
data better.” (Schmidhuber, 2010) 
It is speculation whether this also applies to non-human minds. For example, does 
the mind of a “paperclip maximizer” (Bostrom, 2003) accesses fun space when 
discovering novelties through the creativity drive or the efficiency drive (e.g. finding 
time- or energy saving ways to produce paperclips) or the acquisition drive (e.g. 
finding new resources to be converted into paperclips)? 
 
What is the size of the fun space? 
Since potential knowledge is infinite also the amount of novelties that could 
potentially be gained by a mind is infinite, yet limited by time and other resources. 
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But as we stated, not every processing of novelties triggers fun as an epiphenomenon. 
Given the infinity of the knowledge space it may be assumed that the potential fun 
space is vast. In this regard Yudkowsky posed critical questions: “How much fun is 
there in the universe? Will we ever run out of fun? Could we be having more fun?” 
(Yudkowsky, 2009). We pose an additional question here, which brings us to the 
central part of this paper, i.e. we attempt to establish relations between the space of 
minds and the space of fun: Which minds have (in principle) access to which part of 
the fun space?  
 
4 Relations between the space of minds and the space of fun 
For the formalization we assume that both, all potential minds (Yampolskiy, 2015) 
can be sequentially generated as well as all possible information strings (Yampolskiy, 
2013; Schmidhuber, 2010; Lehman & Stanley, 2015). We also use Yampolskiy’s 
insight that knowledge is discovered by finding and applying an efficient algorithm to 
an inefficiently stored information string (Yampolskiy, 2013). 
In order to investigate the fun space for certain minds we define a Boolean 
function (“fun”) with two parameters, a string representing a mind and another string 
representing information/knowledge as follows:  
 
fun(mind string, info string) = {true, false} 
 
The verbal description of this function would be that it becomes true if for a certain 
mind, represented by a numeric string, the processing of certain information, also 
represented by a numeric string, triggers fun as an epiphenomenon. For all other 
combinations of mind strings and information strings the function is false. The 
formalization is as follows: 
 
fun(x, y) = true, if 
 
[The mind x has the ability/intelligence to turn the info string y efficiently into 
knowledge (access).]  
 
AND 
 
[[The mind x had never turned that specific info string y into knowledge before. 
(novelty fun)]  
 
OR  
 
[The mind x considers the computation process of info string y into knowledge as fun, 
regardless whether it has accessed the info string y before or not. (process fun)]] 
 
This means, the access to the knowledge represented by the information string is the 
precondition for fun. Although the set of human minds is very homogeneous, the 
extent of knowledge, which humans access during their lifetime varies significantly 
because certain minds can not access 1) certain knowledge for intellectual reasons and 
or 2), even if they are intelligent enough, there could be resource or time restrictions:  
 
 Available time and resources: Some minds have to devote most of their 
resources and time for “survival”, i.e. have less resources and time for fun. An 
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example would be a rich person in a developed country vs. a poor person in a 
developing country. 
 
 Life span: Minds are embodied for different durations, i.e. have different life 
spans, which imposes time restrictions on accessing knowledge.  
 
 Time of embodiment: The accessible knowledge was for a particular mind in 
Stone Age quite different from one, who is embodied in 21st century. 
 
We have shown that accessible knowledge varies immensely between minds and 
depends on intelligence, time, resources etc to efficiently turn certain information 
strings into knowledge. Therefore, certain knowledge can neither be part of the 
process nor the novelty fun space of these minds due to their inability to access it. 
After it has been established that a mind x can access the knowledge represented 
by an information string y, at least one of two other assertions has to be true, so that 
fun is involved: New knowledge is ensured 1) by retrieving a new info string y 
(novelty fun) or 2) merely due to the computation process that is applied to info 
string y (process fun). 
These two facets of fun are motivated by Schmidhuber’s “two ways of having 
fun” (Schmidhuber, 2010) and by Yampolskiy’s insights about the relation between 
information strings and knowledge (Yampolskiy, 2013): “Since multiple, in fact 
infinite, number of semantic pointers could refer to the same string that means that a 
single string could contain an infinite amount of knowledge if taken in the proper 
semantic context, generating multiple levels of meaning.” Examples in Table 1 
illustrate the different cases. The fun space is marked with grey background: 
 
Table 1: Types of fun 
Mind x accesses 
info string y 
New info string y Previously accessed info string y 
New 
computation 
process 
Novelty and process fun 
- To watch for the first time a 3D 
movie. 
- To proof that there are infinite 
prime numbers (Euclid). 
- To perform qualia surfing, i.e. to 
experience new qualia (as an 
uploaded mind, see Loosemore). 
Process fun 
- To find a different proof that there are 
infinite prime numbers (Euler)1. 
- To listen to a known song again in 
different context or mood. 
- To look at a painting again in different 
context or mood. 
Trivial/routine 
computation 
process 
Novelty fun 
- To discover a new species of 
beetle in the rain forest. 
- To watch a new episode of a 
cherished TV series. 
- To do sightseeing in a new city. 
- To clean the dishes. 
 
 
 
To elaborate on some examples: 
 
 Novelty fun: To discover a new species of beetle in the rain forest. 
                                                        
1 Euler lived around 2,000 year later than Euclid and knew about Euclid’s proof, i.e. the 
knowledge about the infinity of prime numbers had been accessed before, thus no involvement of 
“novelty fun” for Euler, but his proof was different, thus potential involvement of “process fun” 
for him. 
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In this table “trivial/routine process” means that no innovative computation process 
was required to gain the new knowledge. A biologist may have conducted several 
expeditions to the Amazon rainforest and at a certain day by using her typical 
(therefore, trivial) methodology and basically her eyes, she discovers a new species of 
beetle, which, on a very basic level, is accessing a new information string (which may 
have never been accessed by a human mind before) and for her this is equivalent with 
having novelty fun. 
 
 Process fun: To look at a painting again in different context or mood. 
It is not uncommon to hear people enjoying looking at the same painting again and 
again, e.g. revisiting a particular museum regularly for this purpose. Except for the 
case that they discover new details in the painting, they, on a very basic level, access 
the same information string and by doing so, even repetitively, they have process fun. 
The explanation is provided by Yampolskiy: The same information string can contain 
different knowledge and multiple levels of meaning (Yampolskiy, 2013). 
 
 Novelty and process fun: To perform qualia surfing as an uploaded mind. 
Loosemore defines “qualia surfing” in the context of uploading as “collecting new 
experiences by transferring our consciousness back and forth between different 
substrates” (Loosemore, 2014). One of his several examples is to change “into a body 
that can swim in the atmosphere of Jupiter […], while you stargaze through telescopic 
eyes that can see beyond the visible spectrum”. He explains that even if qualia surfing 
is restricted to the real world there is vast space of new experiences, which would be 
even larger if virtual worlds are added. For a person experiencing certain qualia for 
the first time novelty as well as process fun may be involved. 
 
A less futuristic example is to watch for the first time a 3D movie. The computation 
process, via 3D glasses, is new as well the information string, i.e. content of the 
movie; given the person has not watched it in 2D before.  
It has to be highlighted that it is critical that the function fun(mind string, info 
string) has two parameters. Fun does not only depend on the accessed information 
string, but very much on the individual mind. For example, there are obviously human 
minds who neither enjoy watching movies nor discovering new species of beetles etc.  
A weakness of human minds and therefore a special case is forgotten knowledge. 
In contrast, it is very likely that more sophisticated minds will have a nearly perfect 
memory. When human minds regain forgotten knowledge both could be possible, to 
have fun or not: It could be fun to watch a movie again after a long time because one 
had forgotten the storyline. It may not be fun, but frustrating to spend time re-learning 
vocabulary of a language, which one had not practiced for some time. In both cases 
the same information string is accessed by the same computation process when the 
knowledge had been computed for the first time. 
Based on Yampolskiy’s approach and other mathematical truths it is evident that 
there are infinite information strings, which can be turned through infinite 
computation processes into infinite knowledge (Yampolskiy, 2013). This means 
every access to new knowledge and every new computation of existing or new 
knowledge may or may not involve novelty or process fun respectively. Therefore, 
the questions remain:  
 
Is the fun space also infinite? If yes, are human minds able to access an infinite 
subset of this fun space? 
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One constraint was mentioned above: Some knowledge remains hidden from human 
minds due to insufficient intelligence, time and resources. Those parts of fun space 
that are linked to the novelty and processing of this inaccessible knowledge are thus 
also inaccessible for human minds. We look at an excerpt of a random sample truth 
table for the function fun(mind string, info string) , which is infinite and countable 
since both parameter sets are infinite and countable.  
 
Table 2: Random sample truth table for the function fun 
Sample 
Truth 
table 
fun(x,y) 
Human 
mind 
(t/f) 
Info 
1 
Info 
2 
Info 
3 
Info 
4 
Info 
5 
Info 
6 
Info 
7 
Info 
8 
Info 
9 
… 
Mind 1 f f t f t f t t f f  
Mind 2 t f t t f f f t f t  
Mind 3 f f f f t f f t t f  
…            
 
The overall fun space would be infinite if the truth table of this function would 
contain an infinite number of the value “true”. This we cannot prove. It is possible 
that the number of the value “true” is finite, which implies that in this case the number 
of the value “false” must be infinite.  
For the second question above, we look at specific minds, human minds in 
particular, and their accessible fun space. Therefore, we added the second column in 
the above truth table, which filters human minds out of the space of all minds. In this 
example “Mind 2” happens to be human, and this mind would have infinite fun space 
if that row contained an infinite number of the value “true”. The above question 
whether human minds have access to an infinite subset of the fun space would be 
affirmative, if the following statement was true: 
 
∀ x: human_mind(x) = t  ∧  | {y | fun(x, y) = true} | = ∞ 
 
We do not have a formal answer to this. In fact it is almost certain that not all human 
minds have access to infinite fun space. However, we can observe that the accessible 
fun space has risen in history and is currently enormous, which is linked to what 
Kurzweil describes as the “Law of Accelerating Returns" (Kurzweil, 2005). 
According to this law the rate of change in certain developing systems, for example 
technologies, has shown to increase exponentially. As already mentioned earlier the 
access to the fun space of humans who lived hundreds or thousands of years ago was 
much more restricted than it is for present humans. Only thanks to technologies many 
novelties can be experienced. And also thanks to technologies we have more time at 
hand, which does not have to be spent on life-sustaining activities. Therefore, we may 
assume that future generations can access even larger parts of the fun space.   
 
Fun for human minds with extended life span 
The concern has been expressed that humans with an extended life span will run out 
of fun (Dvorsky, 2012). Yet, an extended life span enables that one limitation above is 
alleviated even further (time). Therefore, all else equal (e.g. the intelligence of this 
ageing mind stays the same) this human mind has the potential to gain additional 
knowledge during the additional time of embodiment, which may entail novelty 
and/or process fun.  
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It is hard to speculate how the access to fun space will be for humans who live for 
thousands or millions of years, but so far life expectancy has been increased 
successively by smaller time frames only. It is likely that more radical extensions 
would be accompanied by other developments to the human phenotype, which we 
discuss below.  
 
Fun for human minds enhanced by intelligence amplification and other 
transhuman features, potentially supported by friendly AI 
Similarly, concern has been raised that humans enhanced by transhuman features 
and/or supported by friendly AI may run out of fun: “If we self-improve human minds 
to extreme levels of intelligence, all challenges known today may bore us. Likewise, 
if superhumanly intelligent machines take care of our every need, it is apparent that 
no challenges nor fun will remain.” (LessWrong Wiki, 2016).  
This argument addresses mainly the above defined “process fun”, i.e. previous 
challenges are becoming too simple. Yet, we have stated not only the infinity of 
computation processes as well as the infinity of knowledge, but also shown that 
trivial/routine computation processes could tap fun space as long as a new 
information string is accessed (of which also an infinite number exists).  
Therefore, even if such minds run out of “process fun”, since previously 
challenging computation processes became much simpler and/or can be performed 
much faster, there should be still sufficient “novelty fun” available. Chances for 
“novelty fun” are actually much higher than for unenhanced human minds, since 
enhanced human minds can reach previously inaccessible knowledge due to 1) 
improved intelligence, 2) much longer life span and 3) more and other resources. 
Enhanced humans will likely have access to additional sensors, which provide for 
“novelty fun” through experiencing new qualia (Loosemore, 2014). This is in line 
with e.g. Bostrom and Yudkowsky, who also believe that enhanced minds will not run 
out of fun, given that they are embodied in a sufficiently advanced context (Bostrom, 
2008; Yudkowsky, 2009). Bostrom is even optimistic regarding “process fun”: “If 
some challenges become too easy for posthumans, they could take on more difficult 
challenges.” 
 
Figure 1: Access of a selection of minds to knowledge and fun space 
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As indicated above, another scenario in the future, which would make the above 
considerations obsolete, is the manipulation of human and other minds through 
technology, known as wireheading, in a way that boredom will be “neurochemically 
impossible” as envisaged by Pearce (Pearce, 2012). For such a manipulated mind 
even uninterrupted dishwashing would be continuous fun. 
 
Fun for AIs and other minds 
We lack evidence to what extent non-human minds can access the fun space, i.e. have 
a sensation of fun as epiphenomenon of any of their activities. It could be anywhere 
between the two extremes, which are to never experience fun (x1) or to have fun no 
matter which information string is accessed (x2). 
 
∀ y: fun(x1, y) = false 
∀ y: fun(x2, y) = true 
 
At least for those non-human minds that are to some extent steered by the drives 
proposed by Omohundro (Efficiency, self-preservation, acquisition, and creativity) 
(Omohundro, 2007, Omohundro, 2008) we may assume that they aim for novelties.  
On the one hand, it would be anthropomorphism to assume that their pursuit of 
novelties is accompanied or motivated by any form of fun. On the other hand, if we 
take our definition of the mind space as the set of all possible cognitive algorithms, 
i.e. an infinite set, there must be other minds, apart from humans, which are able to 
access fun space. And considering the space of all possible cognitive algorithms, there 
must be even minds experiencing fun by performing activities, which have nothing to 
do with detecting novelties. 
  
5 Conclusion and future work 
Based on the groundwork of having described the possible space of minds as well as 
the space of fun we established a relation between the two spaces. We have defined a 
Boolean function fun(mind string, info string) with two parameters, one numeric 
string representing a mind and another numeric string representing 
information/knowledge.  
We have shown that human minds could experience two types of fun by 
transforming information to knowledge: novelty fun and process fun. By means of 
this function we were able to formalize the critical question whether human minds are 
able to access an infinite subset of the fun space. It is beyond our means to give a 
definite answer to the question, but we provided a substantiated assumption that a 
large number of human minds in present time and especially in the future have access 
to a vast space of fun. 
These findings have ethical relevance since human minds strive for fun (not 
merely knowledge). In history as well as still in present time there have been and 
there are numerous humans living a life predominantly characterized by life-
sustaining activities, which do not involve much fun. Yet, ideally the human condition 
improves over time owing, among other things, to advances in technology. Therefore, 
in order to determine whether the extension of the life span and/or enhancements for 
humans really mean progress to the human condition it was critical to show that there 
will be no shortage of accessible fun space for these minds. If it had turned out that 
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there is not sufficient fun for either human minds with extended life span or enhanced 
human minds such developments would probably not be desirable. 
Moreover, these findings can be seen as a contribution to the new field of 
“intellectology” (Yampolskiy, 2015). This field is still in its early stages and provides 
for large areas of further research. To analyze relations between various kinds of 
minds and the fun space extends the traditional human-centric space of research and 
this is what “intellectology” is about. Further research is required on the question how 
to narrow down or to predict more precisely which new computation processes or 
which new knowledge mean fun for a certain mind, especially humans, and which are 
not part of the fun space despite being novel? 
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